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Procedure and Major Regressions
The importance of examining the behavior of yields on new and sea-
soned issues in relation to one another was briefly discussed in Chap-
ter 2 and need not be repeated here. Our method has been primarily
regression analysis. We first considered all the variables that we ex-
pected to significantly influence the spread. We included variables sug-
gested by other studies, we considered our own hypotheses, and we
compared the yield spread with data for related variables to seek cor-
relations that might be suggested by the actual movements of the dif-
ferent series.
Our work covers the first decade after the 1951 Accord, whereby the
pegging of long-term government rates was discontinued, and the pri-
mary analysis was based on two significantly different types of series:
Moody's series of Aa corporates and a series of Aa utilities compiled by
Sidney Homer of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler (Charts 19 and 20).
The Moody series on outstandings is calculated from monthly aver-
ages of the midpoints between bid and asked prices reported in the
daily quotation sheets of dealers. The quotations cover about ten in-
dustrials, ten utilities, and seven rails.Maturities average about
twenty-six years, and the range around this has been very small over
the period studied. Similar homogeneity among new issues cannot be
achieved because of the paucity of new offerings in any month. Maturi-
ties show a wide range of variation, but most run about thirty years.
The industries represented can change completely from month to
month. In nine months of the decade no new Aa securities were issued,
and our number of observations was reduced accordingly.
The Homer series is based on utilities only and depends upon much

















































































































































































































































































































7Yield Spread Between Corporate Securities 109
mostly Moody Aa's, but some Aaa's that normally sell at Aa yields
were included. Data are not monthly averages but first-of-month
quotations. The seasoned series is based on five to ten callable long-
term bonds, usually priced according to dealer quotation sheets. New-
issue yields are based on offering yields of larger issues coming to
market at approximately the first of the month. Partial adjustments
are made on slow-moving issues, where market response indicates in-
appropriate pricing. The most important subjective judgment of all is
an adjustment in the yields on seasoned issues to indicate the yield
of those with coupon similar to the coupon of new issues. This was
necessary in order to eliminate the influence of coupon on yields in
the new-seasoned comparisons. These adjustments were made jointly
by Homer and ourselves.
The dangers of introducing subjective judgments are obvious, but
each was made in order to deal with a genuine limitation of the "ob-
jectively" determined series, including the dubious values of some
Moody quotations caused by lags in response of dealer quotation
sheets. The most satisfactory regression derived for the Moody Aa
corporates, fitted to the period March 1951 through December 1960, is:
M1 =—.105+ .230M10 + .462M30 + .361M36 + .236M37 + .149M38 +.0837
S.E.: .034.018 .035 .082 .060 .045 .021
t:—3.0512.93 13.17 4.39 3.90 3.29 3.98
The key to symbols follows:
M1 =Monthlyaverageofnew-sea- M37 =Seasoned-yieldchange, average
soned yield spread of two to three months preced-
M10 =Averagecoupon difference, new ing minus four to six months
minus seasoned issues preceding
M30 =Changein yield on new issues, M35Seasoned-yield change, average
current minus previous month of four to six months preceding
M3g =Seasoned-yieldchange, preced- minus seven to twelve months
ing month minus average of preceding
two and three months preced- V44 =New-issuevolume, current and
ing precedingmonths,including
directplacements and public
offerings of bonds and equities.
In billions of dollars
With over one hundred observations, the t-values indicate that all
b-coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level or better.' For tech-
1Theconfidence one should place in these significance tests is limited, because
this particular regression was selected after much trial and error. A firmer test will
come when it is applied to new data (cf. p. 118).110 Part II
nical reasons the equation exaggerates the coefficient of multiple cor-
relation (R), but its true value is probably about midway between .92
and .95. This indicates that our equation has "explained" about 87
percent of the variation in new-outstanding yield spreads.
The corresponding regression, using the Homer series of Aa utili-
ties, is:
H1—.041 + .297H35 + .133H36 + .130H37 + .094H38 + .0422 V46 + .021T21
.026.052 .044 .036 .031 .0145 .0078
t:—1.595.74 3.04 3.61 3.00 2.91 2.69
The key to symbols is in most respects essentially the same as in the
Moody series, the only differences being these: H (Homer) replaces M
(Moody); no variable corresponds to M10 since coupon adjustments
have already been made in this series; for technical reasons H35
(change in yield on seasoned issues) appears instead of M30 (change
in yield on new issues); V46 replaces V44 because Homer yield data are
for the first of the month and so volume of new issues here represents
volume for the two preceding months; a new variable, T21, represents
the current Treasury-bill rate.
As in the Moody series, all b-coefficients are significant at the 1 per
cent level or better. For technical reasons the equation understates the
coefficient of multiple correlation (R), but its true value is probably
something in excess of .75. This indicates that the equation "explains"
about 56 per cent of the variance in yield spread aftercorrectionfor
coupon difference. This is equivalent to more than 92 per cent of the
variance in spreads when uncorrected for coupon as in the Moody re-
gression. Analysis indicates that the reason for the superior Homer fit
is both because Homer used only utilities and because his judgments
give a better series. Both series give satisfactory results.
Direct Implication of Regressions
SPURIOUS SPREAD
The most important implication of these regressions is that much
of the commonly observed new-seasoned yield spread and its variation
is essentially spurious. The apparent spread results to a large extent
from the fact that new and seasoned issues may not be homogeneous
with respect to coupon. High-coupon issues are less attractive thanYield Spread Between Corporate Securities 111
otherwise similar low-coupon issues, and consequently the market de-
mands a higher yield on them. There are two reasons for the greater
attractiveness of low-coupon bonds. Most important, high-coupon is-
sues are more likely to be called than others; when they are called,
this requires reinvestment of funds just when rates are relatively low.
A second reason for the relative attractiveness of low-coupon bonds
(hence low-priced bonds) is that the income from them will be more
largely capital gain than in the case of an equal yield on high-coupon
(hence high-priced) issues. This gives tax advantages to the holder of
low-coupon securities. It appears that this tax consideration does not
provide much of the explanation of differences between yields of high-
and low-coupon issues, however, because most corporate bonds are
held by institutions not subject to regular corporate profits taxes. The
influence of coupon on yield is so important that Mark Frankena is
preparing a special study of this question. A summary of part of his
preliminary work is presented at the end of this chapter.
When correction is made in the Moody series on seasoned issues in
order to give yields of bonds with coupon similar to that of new issues,
the average spread for the decade is reduced from 28.7to13.7 basis
points. With respect to variation of spread, an even larger proportion
is explained by coupon differences. The simple correlation between
the uncorrected Moody spread and the coupon difference between
new and seasoned issues is .84, indicating that 71 per cent of the
variance is explained by this variable alone or by others closely cor-
related with it.
The Homer series show even greater influence of coupon differences
on the level of spread. The average spread between yields on new issues
and yields on per cent utilities was 26.5 basis points for the
decade, whereas the average spread when outstandings are corrected
for coupon is only 9.4 basis points.
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIABLES
As indicated above, the regressions suggest that the variables used
may "explain" something in the neighborhood of 90 per cent of
monthly yield spreads between new and outstanding securities. They
also make it possible to measure the relative importance of the in.
dividual variables. From the point of view of realized variations of112 Part II
the spread, this depends not only on the value of the b-coefficient and
its statistical significance but also on how much the variable in ques-
tion moved about during the period studied. To test the importance
of variables from this view, we have asked how much the yield spread
would have varied if a given independent variable moved within the
limits of a band that would include about 95 per cent of its occur-
rences. (More precisely, we took a band between plus and minus two
standard deviations from the mean.) The answers to that question,
based on the two regression equations, are in Table 15.
TABLE 15





Moody Homer Moody Homer
EquationEquation EquationEquation
M10 coupon difference 46.3
M30 H35 yield from last month 37.5 12.3
M36 H36 yield: 2-3 months to last
month
13.6 6.8
M37 H37 yield: 4-6 months to 2-3
months preceding
12.3 8.4
M38 yield: 7-12 months to 4-6
months preceding
10.2 7.7
V46 Two-month volume of new 11.7 5.9
issues
T21 Current Treasury-bill rate 7.5
Addendum: Width of band theoretically
including 95% of the obser-
vations of the yield spread
itself 83.6 32.4
Note: For technical reasons1 the Moody correlation and the influence of
the first change-of-yield variable in the Moody series are exaggerated here.
Other tests show this exaggeration to be small, but it cannot be precisely
quantified.Yield Spread Between Corporate Securities 113
ZERO YIELD SPREADS
Another question may be of interest: if bond yields were entirely
stable, and if no coupon difference existed between new and seasoned
issues, under what circumstances would the yield spread have disap-
peared? The Moody equation implies that this would have occurred
if the two-month volume of new issues equaled $1.2 billion. The
actual two-month volume averaged $1.7 billion. The Homer equation
implies that yield spreads would have disappeared under stable bond
rates if the bill rate had been about 2 per cent and if the new-issue
volume had been negligible. In fact, the bill rate averaged 2.21 per
cent.
Hypotheses for Explanation of Yield Spreads
Although correction for coupon removes a significant part of the ap-
parent spread between yields on new and seasoned issues, we still wish
to explain what remains. The following hypothesis was partly de-
veloped early in our study and then tested with the data; in part it
grew out of modifications of our earlier thought which the data forced
upon us.
The explanation has two major components. In the first place, since
dealers are in the business of selling securities, they wish. to make new
offerings attractive enough to sell promptly. Under many circum-
stances this leads to sweetening the yield on new issues, especially
when there is reason to fear that failure to clear shelves promptly may
bring losses through falling security prices. One part of the explana-
tion of yield spreads, then, should be found in an examination of the
elements that might lead dealers to want to encourage rapid security
sales.
A second component of the cause of new-seasoned yield spreads is
suggested by this question: Why does the market ever let a spread of
this kind develop? So long as new issues are available, why would
anybody buy an otherwise similar seasoned issue at prices that imply
a lower yield? Put otherwise, why is not the market price of outstand-
ings forced down to match the yields available on new offerings?114 Part II
SWEETENING OF NEW-ISSUE YIELDS
With respect to the first of these components of the determinants of
new-seasoned yield spreads (sweetening by dealers), it seems reasonable
that rising yields in the immediate past might encourage the fear of
further decline in security prices. Simple inspection of the data
strongly supports this hypothesis. Next we considered it possible that
the direction of yield movements over a more extended past period
might also influence expectations. Experimentation resulted in the. in-
troduction of the four change-in-yield variables shown in both regres-
sions described above. In some variants of our tests, one of these (M36)
showedan unexplainable negative sign, but in these cases it was not
statistically significant. Except for that, all change-in-yield variables
had positive b-coefficients in a wide variety of regressions (e.g., many
other series than the two mentioned above, and different time periods).
Almost always, as in the two regressions described here, these b-coeffi-
cients were statistically significant at the I per cent level or better.
A second consideration that might be expected to influence the
amount of sweetening expected from dealers is the volume of new
issues thrown on the market in the immediate past and current period.
The most influential feasible variable we found for volume was the
two-month volume of all new corporate issues, including direct place-
ments and equities. The significance of this variable was not uniformly
high among our different tests, but it showed a consistently positive
b-coefficient and it exhibited high statistical significance in our two
major regressions, as shown above.2
Tightness of the money market appears to be a significant explana-
tory variable. We found this influence most reliably indicated when
we used the Treasury-bill rate as our index of a tight market. Because
of very high correlation with coupon difference between new and sea-
soned issues (M10),thisvariable does not appear in the Moody equa-
tion, but it is significant at the 1 per cent level in the Homer equation
and is included there.
Two closely related reasons for this relation suggest themselves. One
is that dealers may be concerned about the financing of their position
in new securities when the money market is tight. A similar reason is
2Theinfluence of the size of individual new issues was not tested. It is possible,
if market segmentation is quite pronounced, that the size of individual new issues
would affect the yield spread while aggregate new issue volume did not.Yield Spread Between Corporate Securities 115
that the carrying cost will be higher (or the gain on it less) under these
conditions.
In all these respects our armchair hypothesis received confirmation
from statistical tests. At one point, however, we received a surprise.
It would seem reasonable to suppose that dealers would watch closely
the performance of other recent issues, and that they would increase
the sweetening of their own if others had moved slowly. We there-
fore entered a variable showing the proportion of new issues that
moved off the market slowly in the current and preceding months.
No matter how we put our equations together, the correlation showed
the "wrong" sign: the yield spread was lower when there were more
slow movers. The explanation which seems to us most plausible is
that causation is working in the opposite direction from what we had
assumed: when sweetening is small, the proportion of slow movers will
be large, assuming other things are equal. This interpretation is given
some support by the fact that the negative correlation is highest when
the proportion of slow movers is taken for the same time period as
that when the yield spread is measured. When the slow mover variable
is lagged, the correlation moves toward zero.
One other negative finding may be of interest. It is commonly argued
that the level of yields on seasoned issues is a major determinant of
the new-seasoned yield spread. In simple correlations this appears to
be true. But the multiple correlation shows that most of this apparent
influence disappears when correction is made for coupon differences
between new and outstanding securities. Some part may persist, but
the remaining correlation between spread and bond rates is less than
that between spread and bill rates. When the latter is used, any re-
maining influence of the level of outstanding yields is virtually or
wholly eliminated.
LAG IN MOVEMENT OF SEASONED YIELDS
We turn now to the second type of consideration that might cause
yield spreads to exist. These spreads depend, we have indicated, upon
the failure of the yields on seasoned issues to move up rapidly to what-
ever yields are provided on new securities. We have sought without
success variables that might logically be expected to influence the
degree of friction in the market and that empirically manifest this
influence. But the extraordinarily great influence of one variable al-116 Part II
ready included may be attributable in part to the presence of such a
lag.Ifthe various factorsthat determine interestrates operate
directly on the new-issue market, new-issue rates should respond
promptly to these forces. If there is sluggishness in the market for
seasoned issues, then a spread should be created when rates generally
rise, and the spread should be much greater when rates rise rapidly.
This has been shown to be the fact. The change in yield from the
preceding month is by all odds the most powerful and the most signifi-
cant variable in all our equations (assuming securities homogeneous
with respect to coupon). It is entirely possible that this variable per-
forms double duty, influencing the sweetening by dealers and reflect-
ing the influence of lags in seasoned yields on the yield spread.
THE PRIMARY MARKET: NEW ISSUES OR SEASONED?
The preceding paragraph raises some important questions regard-
ing the way the securities markets behave. Do the forces that deter-
mine interest rates operate primarily and directly on new issue rates,
to which seasoned issues respond with a lag? Or can we think of the
market for seasoned issues as the major market, where the determi-
nants of interest rates operate directly, and then add that new-issue
yields will reflect these rates subject to the modification imposed by
dealer desires to sweeten yields? We conducted a study of leads and
lags which should contribute to an understanding of this problem.
First we considered the question: Suppose new-issue yields turn
down from month t to month t + 1, but suppose that even at t + 1
these yields are higher than seasoned yields in month t. If the "true"
market is the new-issue market, seasoned yields should continue to
rise, attempting to close the spread, even though rates on new offer-
ings are falling. In twenty-two of thirty-one cases this occurred. If, on
the other hand, seasoned yields turned down along with new issues
even when the new yield in month t + 1 exceeded the seasoned rate
for month t, then seasoned rates must be directly influenced by yield-
determining conditions and not simply move toward closing the gap
with new issues. This occurred nine times.
We explored answers to the same general question by other experi-
ments. One was the study of simultaneous and lagged correlations.
We found that the Moody Aa corporate series for the period from 1952
through 1963 had virtually no correlation between the first differencesYield Spread Between Corporate Securities 117
(one-month changes)of new-issue yields and those seasoned-issue
yields during the preceding month, but that there was a substantial
correlation (.54) between the first differences of seasoned yields and
those of new-issue yields of the preceding month. The correlation
between first differences of new and seasoned yields for the same
month was only slightly higher (.60). Since there was no positive cor-
relation between the first differences of new-issue yields and those of
new-issue yields of the previous month, this indicates that in pre-
dicting changes in seasoned yields the changes in new-issue yields for
the previous month are not simply serving as a proxy variable for the
simultaneous new-issue yield changes. In line with these correlations,
it is noticeable in Chart 1.9 that most of the reversals in new-issue
yields occur a month or so earlier than those in seasoned yields for
Moody's corporates. It is much less noticeable in Chart 20 for public
utility yields.
Both of these experiments support the following conclusion. Mar-
ket forces operate directly on the yields of both new and seasoned
issues, though certainly more rapidly and probably more strongly on
the former. Movements on new-issue yields are a compromise between
forces in the market for money and credit and forces leading to differ-
ent degrees of sweetening by dealers. Movements in seasoned yields
are a similar compromise between forces emanating in the market for
money and credit and forces tending to eliminate the yield spread
between new and outstanding issues.
THE PERFECTION OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
One of the important aims of our entire interest rate project is to
discover how nearly perfect are the markets for money and credit. Do
securities of essentially equal quality sell for similar yields whether
they are direct placements or publicly offered securities, whether
they are mortgages or bonds, whether they are in California or New
York, whether they are seasoned or newly issued, and so forth? In a
perfect market the answer would be "yes," though the identification
of "equal quality" may be too impreciseto provide conclusive
evidence. In the case of new and seasoned issues it is probably easier
to establish homogeneity among securities than anywhere else, yet we
have seen problems even here, especially with respect to coupon. Our
finding on this point is that the market is more nearly perfect than118 Part II
would appear from observation of yield spreads uncorrected for cou-
pon. Furthermore, the imperfection that remains after coupon cor-
rection is eliminated rather quickly. Our studies show that the yield
spread between a new issue and similar outstandings tends to dis-
appear within about three months from date of issue.
A NOTE ON HETEROGENEITY
It should be recognized that even with "perfect" markets, yield
spreads as recorded should not be expected literally to equal zero dur-
ing any given month. In the first place, an Aa rating does not repre-
sent a single point on the quality spectrum but a band stretching from
the weakest Aaa to the strongest A. The new issues of a given month
will not normally fall in the middle of the band, and even the average
of outstandings will vary some. Second, despite the invaluable service
provided by Moody's ratings, the market will sometimes reach a differ-
ent view of quality. This is especially true in relating obligations in
different industries.
These elements of heterogeneity do not suggest that yields on new
would be higher than those on seasoned issues. One other feature of
heterogeneity, however, may imply such a tendency, even with perfect
markets. Viewing a given bond as a unique instruinent, as in some
sense it must be, a new issue is either unseasoned, in which case it
may be considered inferior by the market for that reason, or it is an
addition to the supply of some already outstanding bond, in which
case the supply of that issue may be increased substantially and en-
counter resistance from investors who feel they already hold enough
of it.
Reliability of Findings
Despite the encouraging statistical significance of our b-coefficients
and the high coefficients of multiple correlation, one type of test
gives disturbing results. Similar regressions over different time periods
show sizable differences in b-coefficients, and the predictions for 1961—
62 derived from the Moody regressions for 1951—60 prove to be ex-
tremely bad. The average prediction of spread was nearly 23 basis
points too high. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the
Homer regression provides an excellent forecast of yield spreads for
1961—62, the average discrepancy being less than 3 basis points, apartYield Spread Between Corporate Securities 119
from two bizarre quotations. It is also significant that the most im-
portant variables appear to provide a large part of the explanation
of yield spreads in different time periods. And although the b-coeffi-
cients change substantially, they are almost always of positive sign,
indicating the same kind of influence if not the same amount. The
last two variables, however, volume of new issues and bill rate, while
generally retaining the appropriate sign, moved in and out of the
statistically significant range as different regressions were attempted.
Even our predictions with Moody data, though wide of the mark,
indicate a shift of th.e function (i.e., a change in the constant term)
after 1960 rather than an entirely new functional relationship; the
coefficient of correlation between computed and actual spreads was
.78, reflecting the fact that the computed and actual values generally
rose and fell together, though the curve for computed values was well
above the other.
There are two plausible explanations for this shift. One, as sug-
gested by William H. White, is based on the possibility that after
1959 the market became- accustomed to high rates and gave up the
expectation that they would tend to move back toward a significantly
lower "normal." This changed expectation would imply less chance
that security prices would rise to the point where call features would
impede capital gain. Hence high-coupon issues (new issues) would no
longer tend, for this reason, to sell at higher yields than outstandings.
This explanation is consistent with our finding that the coupon differ-
ence did have far less influence on the yield of securities after 1960
than before. It is also consistent with the fact that the Moody equa-
tion, which includes a term for coupon correction based on the decade
of the fifties, was the one that gave extremely bad (high) predictions
of yield spreads; whereas good predictions were provided by the
Homer series, where coupon correction is made by cross-section studies
at the time of observation. A second explanation, suggested by Sidney
Homer, is that the secular growth of large institutional investors has
caused an increased demand for new issues, driving down their yields.
These considerations suggest to me that our regressions cannot well
be used for future quantitative prediction—with the possible exception
of the Homer equation, which still looks good even for that demand-
ing requirement. Rather, the usefulness of these regressions is to help
test hypotheses about basic influences that cause yield spreads. In view
of the fact that under our hypothesis the yield spread is determined120 Part II
by highly subjective factors (e.g., dealer expectation of future rates),
it would hardly be reasonable to expect great stability in the coeffi-
cients of variables such as those listed. Perhaps the surprising finding
is that there is as much regularity as the data reveal.
One final observation suggests general support for the kind of ex-
planation of yield spreads given here. Data have been plotted for
the period 1920—40, and spreads for those years follow a similar pat-
tern. They were usually positive, especially in times of rising rates.
But they fell to low or even negative values at the end of periods of
sustained declines in interest rates.
The Influence of Coupon and Call on Bond Yields
Because of the importance of coupon differences in explaining the
new-seasoned yield spread, Mark Frankena, a student at Swarthmore
College, is studying the determinants of the spreads between the yields
on seasoned securities with different coupons. This study uses series
constructed by Sidney Homer for the average yields on callable long-
term Aa public utility bonds, as well as the yields on the individual
securities included in the averages. As in the study of the Homer
series reported above, the data are not monthly averages but the yields
prevailing on the first of each month. They cover the period from
January 1957 (in the case of intermediate coupon securities) and
February 1958(inthe caseof higher-coupon securities)through
August 1964. Because the yields and hence coupons on newly issued
Aa utilities did not reach 4 per cent until the second half of 1956 and
rose to 5 per cent for the first time in the second half of 1957, these
are the full periods for which observations of the yields on high-
coupon seasoned securities were available.
The size and importance of the spreads between the yields on is-
sues with different coupons has been noted above. In the period
between January 1957 and 1964, when the coupon on new
issues was 4 per cent or higher in all but two months, the spread be-
tween seasoned securities with current coupon and those with a 2%
per cent coupon accounted for an average of 72 per cent of the total
spread between the yields on new issues and on the outstanding 2%
per cent coupon securities. Chart 21 shows the spreads between the
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SOURCE: Data supplied by Sidney Homer.
Basis
1956—64
to 2% Per Cent Securities,
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964122 Part II
yield on securities with a coupon of 2% to percent. The large
size and the great variability of these spreads is apparent, with the
spread for the 5 per cent group averaging 41 basis points and reach-
ing a high of 100 basis points in May 1958, which was equal to more
than one-fourth of the yield on the low-coupon securities. The low
was 13 basis points in October 1959. Viewed together with the level
of yields on the 2% coupon bonds, the chart also demonstrates, as al-
ready noted in the summary of the new-issue study, that after 1961
the size of spreads at any given level of yields on deep-discount bonds
was substantially lower than in the earlier period, particularly for
the coupon rates in the 4 per cent range.
Superficially it might appear that coupon should be irrelevant to the
yield of a security. Market prices should so adjust themselves that at
any one time the yields of securities would be equal to one another
regardless of the coupon they bear. Further thought, however, suggests
at least three major reasons why a yield spread could develop between
high- and low-coupon bonds. We shall discuss these in turn.
MECHANICAL NECESSITY
One reason for a yield spread according to coupon follows by me-
chanical necessity from the fact that securities cannot readily sell
significantly above call price. If they did, the threat of call would
establish the probability of loss to the buyer who had paid more
than that amount. In consequence, whenever rates fall far enough in
the market that a high-coupon bond reaches its call price, any further
price increases estopped. This means that the yield to maturity can-
not fall further on this bond even though rates may continue to fall
in the rest of the market. We may conclude that if no other cause
of spread existed, then after a high-coupon security reaches its call
price any further fall in low-coupon bond yields must cause an equal
increase in the spread between the two yields.
In the following model we shall assume that a 3 per cent coupon is
low enough to face no threat of call, and we shall let it fully reflect
market interest rates where no distortion from call occurs. The 3 per
cent bond will, therefore, be used as a base from which we shall meas-
ure the yield spread provided by higher coupon issues. We shall
further assume that the call prices of all issues are such that their
yield to maturity when they sell at call price is .5 per cent less than
their yield at par.Yield Spread Between Corporate Securities 123
In Chart 22, panel A, the height of the solid line (ABC) shows the
spread between the yield of a 5 per cent bond and that of a 3 per cent
bond, assuming no cause operates except the mechanical one de-
scribéd above. This curve shows that under this assumption, if the 5
per cent bond sold at call price (so that it yielded 4.5 per cent), the
spread would be zero when the 3 per cent one sold to yield 4.5 per
cent also. Corresponding to this point on the horizontal axis, and to
all points on the right of it, the "spread" curve lies on the horizontal
axis. That is, there is no "mechanical" reason for a yield spread when
rates on low-coupon bonds exceed 4.5 per cent. If the low coupon
yield falls to 2.5 per cent, the spread must rise to 2 per cent (4.5—2.5)
since the high coupon return is unable to fall below 4.5 per cent. In
summary, ABC, which shows by its height the spread between the
yields of these two securities, slopes at 45 degrees from A to B, where
it becomes horizontal at zero. Under similar assumptions A'B'C' in
panel B shows approximately the minimum spread mechanically pos-
sible between the yield of a 4 per cent security and that of the 3 per
cent security. These curves suggest a more general three-dimensional
model as shown in panel C by the solid lines. Here the coupon spread
between low- and higher-coupon securities is depicted by the height
of the plane above the floor, this being determined by the coupon
of the security in question (measured from M toward N), and by the
level of yield on the low coupon issue (measured to the right from
M toward P).
THE INFLUENCE OF POTENTIAL CAPITAL GAINS
The curves and surfaces just described indicate a minimum below
which spreads can fall only very little: only to the extent, indeed, im-
plied by slight price rises above call price. But other considerations
may cause the spread to be more than indicated by this analysis,
though not less. Since the high-coupon bond cannot rise above its
call price, buyers have more opportunity of capital gains when hold-
ing low-coupon issues. In view of this, high-coupon bonds must sell
to yield enough more than low-coupon bonds to compensate for the
foregone opportunity of capital gain. The yield spread so caused will
be large when the chance of greater capital gain on low coupons is
especially great. The dotted line in panel B of Chart 22 indicates
possible spreads as a result of this consideration. At times when both
security prices are very low, the imminence of call threat is minor,124 Part II
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and the yield spread might be quite small. For example, if we found
ourselves in the neighborhood of C' the threat of call might seem
remote enough to permit a very low spread, as shown by the height
of the dotted line. At B', however, there is no significant possibility of
any capital gain at all on the high-coupon bond, and so it would
surely have to offer a yield advantage to attract buyers. Thus the
dotted line there is appreciably above zero. By the time rates fall to
2.5 per cent, however, further yield declines are unlikely because of
the usual limits of variation in market interest rates and they are
impossible if our "sta.ndard" low-coupon security is still callable. For
this reason, little additional spread beyond the mechanically deter-
mined minimum may be required. Thus the dotted curve may ap-
proach A'B' as rates fall from their level at B'.
It seems reasonable that expectations about the direction of future
interest rate movements should influence the market's judgment about
the danger of call on high-coupon bonds, with consequent effects on
yield spreads. If, as our other studies suggest, falling rates tend to
produce the expectation of further declines, then the dotted curve
should tend to rise when rates fall, since this fall suggests that prices
may rise toward call price on high-coupon bonds. When rates are
rising, the call threat would be reduced and the dotted curve of panel
B should shift down.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
A third major reason why the market might provide a higher yield
on high-coupon bonds than on low is founded on income tax con-
siderations. Since coupon receipts are taxed as income, and since for
many investors capital gain is taxed at a much lower rate, the market
should much prefer low-coupon bonds where a larger part of any given
yield to maturity is in the form of capital gains. A yield advantage
would be required on high-coupon securities in order to attract buyers.
This advantage would occur at all yields where the low-coupon bond
was selling below par. It would be operative to the extent that the
market is dominated by investors who stand to benefit from the sub-
stitution of capital gains for ordinary income.
Frankena's study is an attempt to test these and other hypotheses
against available data. Chart 23 illustrates his findings for selected
individual securities. Line ABC has the same interpretation as in126 Part II
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panel A of Chart 22. Observations of yield spreads at times of falling
rates are marked X, circles pertain to periods of rising rates, while
dots distinguish periods of no trend. These charts reveal all the char-
acteristics we hypothesized in relation to the first two causes of a
yield spread based on coupon. No observations lie significantly below
ABC except in the highest-coupon security in a time of rising rates.
Spreads are substantial at B, where the bond in question would have
been at call price if there were no spread. The excess of spread above
ABC declines on either side of B. When rates are rising, generating the
expectation of further fall in security prices, the threat of call is taken
less seriously and hence the spreads (0) are generally much less than
when rates are falling (X).
This chart fails to answer the question: Do the spreads tend to
level out in the neighborhood of zero as we move to the right, and if
so, at what point does this leveling occur? Charts similar to the first
panel in Chart 23 for other issues generally indicate that the spread
does come close to zero, and that this commonly occurs when the price
of the high-coupon issue is at or below par. This fact suggests that the
tax advantage of low-coupon securities is probably not important. Ac-
cording to market practitioners there are so few corporate bonds in
the hands of taxable institutions and individuals that their influence
on this market is almost negligible.
After presenting this neat picture of the implications to be drawn
from our empirical study, I must unfortunately muddy the water by
describing some unsolved problems. In the first place we have greatly
clarified the picture presented above by admitting to Chart 23 only
the period from January 1957 to June 1961. Had we taken a much
longer span we would have observed a fairly sharp shift of our implied
curve from one time to another. The year 1958 is an occasion to itself,
when sharply falling rates were followed by expectation of further fall
even from their low point. These observations can be seen appropri-
ately clustered at the upper left of each panel (points numbered 13
to 19 are January—July 1958, respectively). The years 1959—60 present
another pattern as shown in the rest of the graph. But the period
1961—64, not included in the chart, clusters well below the points
shown here. None of the variables we have examined appears to pro-
vide an adequate explanation for this shift. The best rationalization
known to us has been provided by Sidney Homer. After 1960 theYield Spread Between Corporate Securities 129
volume of new publicly offered corporate issues declined markedly
relative to governments. New corporate issues had fairly low coupons,
andmanyoutstanding high-coupon issues were called. Since govern-
ments are non-callable through most of their term and therefore serve
partly as substitutes for low-coupon issues, this shift, together with
the lower volume of high-coupon corporates, implied lower prices
and higher yields on low coupons and higher prices and lower yields
on high-coupon issues. The result would be a smaller yield spread
between high- and low-coupon issues. The shift is also consistent with
the possibility that during 1961 the market, having become accus-
tomed to the higher level of rates of the past few years, no longer ex-
pected them to fall sufficiently to justify the calling of issues with cou-
pons in the 4 per cent range or lower. Such a change in expectations
would reduce the yield compensation required as an incentive to hold
high-coupon issues.
Our second unsolved problem is that of deriving a satisfactory regres-
sion equation to describe the hypersurface corresponding to the dotted
curves of panel C in Chart 22, but reflecting also the shifts of this
surface brought about by yield changes (as opposed to the level of
yields, which is already shown). It is clear from our data that this
surface is not linear, nor is it linear in logarithms. One reason is that
the change-in-yield variable has little influence when rates are so low
that there is little chance of their falling further, but substantial in-
fluence when rates are somewhat higher, as we have shown in Chart 23.
Another complication arises from the fact that the influence of the
level of rates is compelling as the determinant of a floor to spreads
when rates are low, but it provides a much less binding effect when
rates are high. A related problem arises in 1958, when the rapid de-
cline of rates "takes statistical credit" for the high spreads which were
in fact brought about by the mechanical limits depicted by AB. A
fourth and less difficult problem arises from the fact that spreads and
change-in-yield variables are sometimes negative, which forces a modi-
fication of equations expressed in logarithms.
One test equation which we explored, although it does not overcome
all these problems, showed all the variables of our model clearly sig-
nificant and with the proper sign for our hypotheses. It also provided
a coefficient of multiple correlation of .92. The independent variables
included were coupon, yield of low-coupon bonds, change of yield130 PartII
of low-coupon bonds during each of three past periods, and the volume
of new issues. The influence of volume appeared to be most significant
in relation to the shift of the curve between 1959—60 and 1962—63,
but it was not significant within the latter period. This finding is
consistent with Homer's suggested explanation of the change that took
place between these two periods.
The influence of these variables is consistent with the first two
hypotheses described in this review, but not with the third. That is,
there is clear evidence of the mechanically necessary spread that must
arise when low-coupon issues yield less than the call-price yield of
high-coupon bonds. There is quite consistent evidence that the limi-
tation on capital gains from high-coupon issues increases this spread
above the mechanical minimum for some distance on both sides of
the point where the yield of the low-coupon bond equals the call-price
yield of the high-coupon bond. And there is general evidence that
spreads at rates above this level are not sufficient to confirm the view
that tax advantages of low-coupon bonds account for any appreciable
amount of the spread.